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It is always pleasing to find one‟s work as the focus of attention by senior scholars in the 
field.  I am grateful to both Steve Bruce and David Voas for highlighting the notion of 
“vicarious religion” and for offering their comments on this idea.  I am equally grateful to 
Elisabeth Arweck of the Journal for Contemporary Religion for permitting me to respond to 
this piece.
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  My intention in the following paragraphs is two-fold:  to clarify what I mean by 
vicarious religion and to defend my use of this term in the understanding of religion in 
modern Europe.  I will do this under four headings:  origins and definition, one factor among 
many, methodological challenges, and imagination and usage. 
 One point, however, is important before going further.  It concerns the summary that 
Bruce and Voas give of vicarious religion, which draws largely on my own work (Davie, 
Religion in Modern Europe and Davie, “Vicarious Religion”).  These sources are correct, but 
the attentive reader would do well to look again at the original texts.  In places, the rendering 
of my account given by Bruce and Voas lacks the nuance that can be seen more easily in the 
earlier versions.  
 
Origins and definition 
How then did the idea of vicarious religion first emerge?  For most of my working life, I have 
drawn attention to the middle ground in the religious life of both Britain and Europe – i.e. to 
the very large number of people (around 50% of the population) who are neither involved 
with organized religion, nor consciously opposed to it.  Both I and others (including Bruce 
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and Voas) agree on the importance of doing this.  I have also tried to develop tools and 
concepts which have enabled a better understanding of this constituency.  My first attempt to 
do this led to the phrase “believing without belonging”  – an idea which generated a 
considerable, and continuing debate.   Gradually, however, I felt that this phrase needed 
further refinement, which led in turn to the notion of “vicarious religion”.  The reasons are as 
follows. 
The separating out of belief from belonging undoubtedly offered fruitful ways in 
which to understand and to organize the material about religion in modern Europe.  Up to a 
point it also captured the space between the hard and soft variables concerning religious 
attachments:  belief normally gathers a wider constituency than belonging.  On-going 
reflection about the current situation, however, has encouraged me to reflect more deeply 
about the relationship between the belief and belonging.   It is quite clear, for example, that 
“belief” can be both hard and soft, as indeed can “belonging”.  It was in thinking about the 
latter, that the notion of vicarious religion began to emerge.  It was a way of describing the 
continuing attachment of large sections of the European population to their historic churches, 
whether or not they attended these institutions on a regular basis.  I came to the conclusion – 
for the reasons set out in the two articles listed above – that the idea of vicarious religion, as 
“the notion of religion performed by an active minority but on behalf of a much larger 
number, who (implicitly at least) not only understand, but, quite clearly, approve of what the 
minority is doing” (“Vicarious Religion” 22) was a helpful contribution to the sociological 
debate. 
Large numbers of people (scholars, journalists, practitioners, commentators of various 
kinds) agree with me.  But not everyone is equally positive, including Bruce and Voas.  It is 
unwise to generalize, but on the whole those who resist the idea of vicarious religion fall into 
the same category as those who resist the notion of believing without belonging, and for the 
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same reasons.  All of them do a similar thing.  They take a concept that was intended to direct 
attention to the religious habits of a section of the population that remains loosely attached to 
the mainstream churches of Europe (and to find creative ways of thinking about their 
behaviour), and turn this into something far more rigorously defined that I intended.  The 
next step is to “test” this reconfigured notion in a way that is not appropriate.  Precisely this 
has happened in the preceding article.  If “vicarious religion” is defined in the way that these 
authors prefer, then the logic of their argument is clear enough – but the phrase was never 
intended to be used in this way.  It is for this reason that the essential subtlety is lost.   
And whatever the case, the underlying problem remains:  how do we understand the 
religious penumbra of modern European societies and how should we describe this 
sociologically?  Voas offers “fuzzy fidelity” as an alternative (Voas).  I have absolutely no 
problem with the latter, but remain convinced that a notion that probes the implicit and well 
as explicit connections between this still significant body of people and the historic churches 
of Europe remains a useful contribution. 
 
One factor among many 
A second point is equally important – the notion of vicarious religion needs to be placed in 
context.  It is not the only variable to be taken into account.  There are, in fact, five or six 
factors that must be considered if we are to grasp fully the complexities of the current 
situation with regard to religion in Europe (see Davie, “Is Europe the exceptional case?”, and 
“Religion in Europe in the 21st century”).  These factors not only change and adapt over time, 
they push and pull in different directions. The six factors are:   
1. The role of the historic churches in shaping European culture.  This is easily illustrated in 
the sense that the Christian tradition has had an irreversible effect on time (calendars, 
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seasons, festivals, holidays, weeks and weekends) and space (the parish system and the 
dominance of Christian buildings) in this part of the world.    
2. An awareness that the historic churches still have a place at particular moments in the 
lives of modern Europeans, though they are no longer able to discipline the beliefs and 
behaviour of the great majority of the population.  Despite their relatively secularity, 
Europeans are likely to return to their churches at moments of celebration or grief 
(whether individual or collective).   
3. An observable change in the churchgoing constituencies of the continent, which operate 
increasingly on a model of choice, rather than a model of obligation or duty. As a result, 
membership of the historic churches is changing in nature; increasingly it is chosen rather 
than inherited, though more so in some places than in others. 
4. The arrival into Europe of groups of people from many different parts of the world.  This 
is primarily an economic movement, but the implications for the religious life of the 
continent are immense.  The growing presence of Christians from the global South 
alongside significant other faith communities has altered the religious profile of Europe.  
Quite apart from this, some of these communities are – simply by their presence – 
challenging some deeply held European assumptions, notably the notion that religion 
should be considered a private matter.   
5. Rather different are the sometimes vehement reactions of Europe‟s secular elites to this 
shift:  i.e. to the increasing significance of religion in public as well as private life. Such 
elites did not anticipate a change of this nature and have been obliged to respond, 
sometimes aggressively, sometimes less so. 
6. A gradual, but growing realization that the patterns of religious life in modern Europe 
should be considered an „exceptional case‟ – they are not a global prototype.  It short, 
Europeans are beginning to realize that Europe is secular not because it is modern, but 
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because it is European.  It is equally true that some Europeans welcome this insight; 
others are disconcerted by it. 
 
Vicarious religion is easily located in this list – it is one way of understanding better the 
implications of the second factor:  the awareness that the historic churches still have a place 
at particular moments in the lives of modern Europeans, though they are no longer able to 
discipline the beliefs and behaviour of the great majority of the population.  “Believing 
without belonging”, the predecessor of vicarious religion can be similarly placed.  Neither, 
however, is the whole story, nor was it ever intended to be.  Indeed a number of Bruce‟s and 
Voas‟ criticisms can be answered by taking some of the other factors into account – notably 
the first (cultural heritage) and the third (the shift from obligation to consumption).  It is 
simply that they have selected one factor for their attention and found it incapable of 
explaining everything.  I agree. 
An additional point follows from this.  In both the articles cited in this section, I argue 
that vicarious religion is a crucial factor in understanding religion in Europe at the present 
moment.  I also state quite clearly that I do not expect this idea to resonate indefinitely.  
Specifically, I suggest that by the mid twenty-first century, something rather different will be 
happening:  increasingly religion will be chosen rather than inherited and the range of choices 
will include forms of religion that have come into Europe from outside.  Vicarious religious 
is not, therefore, the opposite of secularization theory, as Bruce and Voas seem to imply; it is 
one factor among many in the continuing re-adjustments of religious life in modern Europe.  
Interestingly, Voas suggests the same with respect to fuzzy fidelity – that is will rise and fall 
over a very extended period.  How long that will take is an empirical question; it cannot be 





For the time being, therefore, vicarious religion requires our close attention, which presents in 
turn a significant methodological challenge.  This was one reason for the illustrations of this 
concept set out in Davie (“Vicarious Religion”):  how does it work in practice?  There is no 
need to repeat these here, though to appreciate their subtlety, they do need to be read in the 
original rather than in the Bruce and Voas version.  All of them have one thing in common: 
they are attempts to reveal forms of religion that normally lie hidden.  An iceberg may 
provide a helpful analogy.  It is easy enough both to measure and to take note of the part of 
the iceberg that emerges from the water.  But this is to ignore the mass underneath, which is 
invisible for most of the time – but without which the visible part would not be there at all.  
How, though, can a sociologist penetrate more deeply in order to understand what is going on 
beneath the surface? 
One way is to observe societies at particular moments in their evolution when 
“normal” ways of living, for one reason or another, are suspended and something far more 
instinctive comes to the fore.  As Bruce and Voas note, I have used the examples of Princess 
Diana and of the tragic episode that took place in village of Soham, Cambridgeshire, in 2004 
to illustrate this point.  My interlocutors choose to interpret these events rather differently.  
To be frank, I do not accept their readings of these episodes, nor the tone in which they are 
delivered, but that in turn depends on how you define vicarious religion in the first place – we 
are in danger of going round in circles.  It might be more helpful to try another example.  
Without doubt, the unexpected and very poignant series of actions that took place at the end 
of Jade Goody‟s life offer an almost perfect example of what I am trying to convey (whatever 
you choose to call it).  Here is a young woman whose life-style was a million miles from the 
respectabilities of traditional Anglicanism.  At the end of her short life, however, she turned 
to the church repeatedly – for the baptism of her children and for herself, for her somewhat 
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unusual wedding, and finally for her much more traditional funeral.  Please don‟t tell me that 
the priest who enabled all this was merely the best person to act as “master of ceremonies” on 
these very affecting occasions.  Something rather more profound was going on which 
demands our sociological attention.  Further very penetrating examples can be found in 
Coakley and Wells.  It is episodes such as these that I doing my best to understand.   
The crucial point to grasp in terms of sociological method is the need to be attentive 
to moments, whether individual or collective, in or through which the implicit becomes 
explicit.  It is equally important to remember that the examples described above are simply 
large-scale and often media-hyped versions of what goes on all the time in the life-cycles of 
ordinary people.  Individual families and communities regularly pause for thought at critical 
moments in their existence, frequently marking these with some form of liturgy (Billings).  
These are moments when the normal routines of life are suspended, when – to put the same 
point in a different way – the abnormal becomes normal, in terms of conversation as well as 
behaviour.  You need only listen to the conversation immediately after a birth or a death to 
realize that. 
What in fact is at stake in these debates is a philosophy of science which has profound 
implications for methodology.  Social life is not merely an aggregate of individual attitudes 
and behaviours, and thus amenable to the survey research so beloved of positivists.  It is a 
subtle, many-layered, shifting and constantly evolving entity, which cannot easily be broken 
down into straightforward, testable hypotheses.  Vicarious religious must be approached 
accordingly.  It involves not only individuals, but institutions, traditions, assumptions, 
emotions, dispositions – including unconscious ones; it requires therefore an historically 
informed, highly sophisticated research design to test it adequately.  How this is done may 
vary from place to place, but above all it calls for a developed sociological imagination. 
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Imagination and usage 
Who better than C.W. Mills to evoke the sociological imagination?  Not himself interested in 
religion, he suggests nonetheless that we “re-arrange” the file, abandon the conventional 
script, engage with reality rather than received truth, but – at the same time – think rigorously 
about what is going on (Mills).  In short, the aim of social science is to open up new areas of 
research, to pose new research questions and to investigate them thoroughly.  How then 
should we approach the sections of the population who are neither involved with organized 
religion, nor consciously opposed to it and what are the precise research questions which 
might stimulate the debate?  Might not careful and, above all, sensitive thinking about the 
notion of vicarious religion be one way of doing this?   
Rather more pragmatically, I rest my case for the helpfulness of this concept on my 
own experience.  I have introduced this idea all over Europe (from the Nordic countries to the 
Balkans), and in virtually every situation it is not only understood by the audience in question 
but evokes a positive response, together with a host of examples from whatever context I am 
in.  The fact that this happens repeatedly despite language differences and the need to work 
with an interpreter is remarkable.  Indeed the reactions of interpreters are interesting in 
themselves: at first somewhat baffled (this is not a common place term for most of them), 
they get the idea very quickly and find ways of expressing it in their own language.  The 
response is invariably gratifying. 
In the United States, conversely, where the religious situation is very different, even 
an English-speaking audience finds it difficult to grasp this idea – quite clearly it does not 
resonate with American self-understanding.  Indeed vicarious religion captures the contrast 
between the patterns of religion in Europe and the United States almost better than anything 
else – Bellah‟s “civil religion” is close, but it is not the same.  The essential difference lies in 
the “on behalf of” element in vicarious religion, which rests in turn on the legacy of the state 
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church.  Mentalities endure even when the institution has altered considerably.  Here then is 
yet another reason to appreciate the usefulness of vicarious religion.   Not only does it help us 
to penetrate the middle ground of religious life in Europe, it also highlights the specificity of 
the European case.    
The clearest illustrations of all can, of course, be found in those parts of Europe (the 
Nordic countries and Germany) where some form of church tax is still in place – in other 
words where the population as a whole, rather than the actively faithful, contribute to the 
maintenance of the churches and to the people who work in them.  The most striking thing 
about the Nordic countries is the relatively small number of people who decide to “contract 
out” of this system.  Some do, but most continue tangibly to support their churches (the 
financial contribution is not negligible), despite the markedly low levels of both churchgoing 
and orthodox religious belief in this part of the world.  Why do they do this?  One assumes 
that they wish these institutions to continue in existence.  
The German case, conversely, is changing rapidly, provoked at least in part by the 
different religious situation in the former East – reminding us that vicarious religion is more 
vulnerable in some parts of Europe than others.  Particularly in the Protestant churches of 
Germany, membership (together with financial contributions) is falling fast.  Interestingly, 
however, it is German scholars – notably Jürgen Habermas – who have prompted the next 
stage in my thinking.  Appreciative of the concept of vicarious religious, they have asked a 
different, more philosophical question.  Does the notion of acting vicariously imply 
intentionality?  Is it necessary, in other words, for the actor to be conscious of what he or she 
is doing?  And how might this apply to institutions?  Encouraged by their attention to my 
work, I continue to reflect on the implications of these insights.  I have no doubt that the 
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1   Warm thanks are also due to the various scholars who have helped me to understand better 
the notion of vicarious religion – among them are Nancy Ammerman, Peter Berger, David 
Martin and Linda Woodhead, some of whom have offered valuable comments on this 
response. 
